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Abstract
We propose an algorithm to enhance certified
robustness of a deep model ensemble by op-
timally weighting each base model. Unlike
previous works on using ensembles to empir-
ically improve robustness, our algorithm is
based on optimizing a guaranteed robustness
certificate of neural networks. Our proposed
ensemble framework with certified robustness,
RobBoost, formulates the optimal model se-
lection and weighting task as an optimization
problem on a lower bound of classification
margin, which can be efficiently solved using
coordinate descent. Experiments show that
our algorithm can form a more robust ensem-
ble than naively averaging all available models
using robustly trained MNIST or CIFAR base
models. Additionally, our ensemble typically
has better accuracy on clean (unperturbed)
data. RobBoost allows us to further improve
certified robustness and clean accuracy by cre-
ating an ensemble of already certified models.
1 Introduction
The lack of robustness in deep neural networks (DNNs)
has motivated recent research on verifying and improv-
ing the robustness of DNN models (Katz et al., 2017;
Dvijotham et al., 2018c; Gehr et al., 2018; Singh et al.,
2018; Madry et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018b;
Wong and Kolter, 2018; Zhang et al., 2018). Improv-
ing the robustness of neural networks, or designing
the “defense” to adversarial examples, is a challenging
problem. Athalye et al. (2018); Uesato et al. (2018)
showed that many proposed defenses are broken and
do not significantly increase robustness under adaptive
attacks. So far, state-of-the-art defense methods in-
clude adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018; Sinha
et al., 2018) and optimizing a certified bound on ro-
bustness (Wong and Kolter, 2018; Raghunathan et al.,
This is an extended version of ICLR 2019 Safe Machine
Learning Workshop paper, “RobBoost: A provable approach
to boost the robustness of deep model ensemble”.
May 6, 2019. New Orleans, LA, USA
2018a; Wang et al., 2018a; Mirman et al., 2018), but
there is still a long way to go to conquer the adversarial
example problem. On MNIST at perturbation  = 0.3,
adversarially trained models (Madry et al., 2018) are
resistant to strong adversarial attacks but cannot be
efficiently certified using existing neural network ver-
ification techniques. On the other hand, certifiable
training methods usually suffer from high clean and
verified error; in (Wong et al., 2018), the best model
achieves 43.1% verified error and 14.9% clean error,
which is much higher than ordinary MNIST models.
Most of these existing defense methods only focus on im-
proving the robustness of a single model. Traditionally,
a model ensemble has been used to improve prediction
accuracy of weak models. For example, voting or boot-
strap aggregating (bagging) can be used to improve
prediction accuracy in many occasions. Furthermore,
boosting based algorithms, including AdaBoost (Fre-
und and Schapire, 1997), LogitBoost (Friedman et al.,
2000), gradient boosting (Friedman, 2001, 2002) and
many other variants, are designed to minimize an up-
per bound (surrogate loss) of classification error, which
provably increases the model’s accuracy despite the fact
that each base model can be very weak. Inspired by
the successful story of model ensembles, our question
is that if a similar technique can be used to build a
robust model with better provable robustness via an
ensemble of certifiable base models?
Intuitively, attacking an ensemble seems to be harder
than attacking a single model, because an adversary
must fool all models simultaneously. Some works on
using a model ensemble to defend against adversarial
examples (Abbasi and Gagné, 2017; Strauss et al., 2017;
Liu et al., 2018; Pang et al., 2019; Kariyappa and
Qureshi, 2019) show promising results that they can
indeed increase the required adversarial distortion for
a successful attack and improve robustness. However,
none of these works attempt to propose a provable
(or certifiable) method to improve model robustness
via an ensemble, so there is no guarantee that these
methods work in all situations. For example, He et al.
(2017) reported that attacking a specialist ensemble
only increases the required adversarial distortion by as
little as 6% compared to a single model.
In this paper, we propose a new algorithm, RobBoost,
that can provably enhance the robustness certificate of
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a deep model ensemble. First, we consider the setting
where a set of pretrained robust models are given, and
we aim to find the optimal weights for each base classi-
fier that maximize provable robustness. We select the
weight for each base model iteratively, to maximize a
lower bound on the classification margin of the neu-
ral network ensemble classifier. Given a set of T base
models which are individually certifiable, we formulate
a certified robustness bound for the model ensemble
and show that solving the optimal ensemble leads to
an optimization problem. We propose a coordinate de-
scent based algorithm to iteratively solve the RobBoost
objective. Second, we consider training each base classi-
fier sequentially from scratch, in a setting more similar
to traditional gradient boosting, where each model is
sequentially trained to improve the overall robustness
of the current ensemble. Our experiments show that
RobBoost can select a set of good base classifiers and
weight them optimally, outperforming a naive average
of all base models; on MNIST with `∞ perturbation
of  = 0.3, RobBoost reduces verified error from 36%
(averaging models) to 34% using 12 certifiable base
models trained individually.
2 Related Work
2.1 Neural network robustness verification
The robustness of a neural network can be verified
by analyzing the reachable range of an output neuron
for all possible inputs within a set (for example, a
perturbed image with bounded `∞ norm), thus the
margins of predictions between the top-1 class and
other classes can be examined. Unfortunately, find-
ing the exact reachable range is NP-complete (Katz
et al., 2017) and is equivalent to a mixed integer linear
programming problem (Tjeng et al., 2019; Xiao et al.,
2019). Therefore, many recent works in robustness
verification develop computationally tractable ways to
obtain outer bounds of reachable ranges. As robustness
verification can be cast into a non-convex minimization
problem (Ehlers, 2017), one approach is to resort to du-
ality and give a lower bound of the solution (Dvijotham
et al., 2018c; Qin et al., 2019; Dvijotham et al., 2018a).
Also, we can relax the primal optimization problem
with linear constraints, and obtain a lower bound of the
original problem using linear programming (LP) or the
dual of LP (Wong and Kolter, 2018; Wong et al., 2018).
However, solving LPs for a relatively large network can
still be quite slow (Salman et al., 2019). Fortunately,
the relaxed LP problem can be solved greedily in the
primal space (Zhang et al., 2018; Weng et al., 2018;
Wang et al., 2018b) or in the dual space (Wong and
Kolter, 2018). “Abstract transformers” (Singh et al.,
2018, 2019a; Gehr et al., 2018; Mirman et al., 2018;
Singh et al., 2019b) propagate an abstraction of input
regions layer by layer to eventually give us bounds on
output neurons. See (Salman et al., 2019; Liu et al.,
2019) for a comprehensive discussion on the connections
between these algorithms.
Our work relies on the neural network outer bounds pro-
posed in (Zhang et al., 2018; Weng et al., 2018; Wong
and Kolter, 2018), which are the state-of-the-art meth-
ods to efficiently give an upper and a lower bound for an
output neuron given an `p-norm bounded input pertur-
bation. These bounds are essentially linear with respect
to input perturbations, which is crucial for developing
a tractable framework (see Proposition 3.1 for more de-
tails). Besides these methods, local Lipschitz constants
can also be used for efficiently giving a formal robust-
ness guarantee (Hein and Andriushchenko, 2017; Zhang
et al., 2019); tighter bounds can be obtained by semi-
definite programming (SDP) based methods (Raghu-
nathan et al., 2018a,b; Dvijotham et al., 2019), al-
though they scale much poorly to larger models.
2.2 Defending against adversarial examples
We categorize existing defending techniques into two
categories: certified defenses that can provably increase
the robustness of a model, and empirical defenses that
are mostly based on heuristics that have not been
proven to improve robustness with a formal guarantee.
Empirical defenses, even sophisticated ones, can possi-
bly be evaded using stronger or adaptive attacks (Atha-
lye et al., 2018; Carlini and Wagner, 2017a,c,b). We
mostly focus on certified defenses in our paper, since
our proposed method requires certified base models to
create a certifiable ensemble.
Since many robustness verification methods give us a
lower bound on the output margin between the ground-
truth class and other classes under norm bounded input
perturbation, optimizing a loss containing this bound
obtained by a differentiable verification method will
lead to maximizing this margin and improving verified
error on the training set. For example, Wong et al.
(2018); Wong and Kolter (2018) propose to minimize
the verified error through a cross-entropy loss surrogate
using LP relaxation based verification bounds; Wang
et al. (2018a) optimize a similar verification bound;
Dvijotham et al. (2018b) proposes to learn the dual
variables in dual relaxations using a learner network
during training; Mirman et al. (2018) propose an differ-
entiable version of abstract transformers and include
the obtained bounds in loss function to provably in-
crease robustness. Raghunathan et al. (2018a) propose
to control the global Lipschitz constant of a 2-layer
network to give a certified robustness bound, but it
cannot be easily extended to multiple layers.
Previous certified defenses mostly focus on improving
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the robustness of a single model. In Wong et al. (2018),
multiple models are considered in a cascaded manner,
where each subsequent model is trained using the ex-
amples that cannot be certified by previous models. In
inference time, only the last cascaded model is consid-
ered. RobBoost works in a different scenario, where
we consider how to combine certified base classifiers
to a stronger one with better verified error. Empirical
defenses using ensembles include (Pang et al., 2019;
Kariyappa and Qureshi, 2019; Abbasi and Gagné, 2017;
Strauss et al., 2017), however they do not provide prov-
able robustness guarantees.
3 The RobBoost Algorithm
Notations. We define a C-classH-layer feed-forward
classification neural network f(x) ∈ RC as
f(x) = W(H)h(H−1)(x) + b(H)
h(l)(x) = σ(l)(W(l)h(l−1)(x) + b(l)),∀l ∈ {1, . . . ,H − 1},
where h(0) := x and layer l’s weight matrix is W(l) ∈
Rnl×nl−1 and bias vector is b(l) ∈ Rnl . Input x ∈
Rd and for convenience we define n0 = d. σ(l) is a
component-wise activation function. For convenience,
we denote the row vector A(j,:) as the j-th row of
matrix A, column vector A(:,i) as the i-th column of
matrix A. Additionally, We define the `p ball centered
at x0 with radius  as Bp(x0, ) := {x|‖x− x0‖p ≤ },
1 ≤ p ≤ ∞. We use [n] to denote the set {1, · · · , n}.
We denote a training example as a pair (xk, yk), where
xk ∈ Rd, yk ∈ [C] is the class label, k ∈ [N ] and N is
the total number of training examples.
3.1 Linear outer bounds for neural networks
We start with guaranteed linear upper and lower
bounds for a single neural network f(x):
Proposition 3.1 (Linear outer bounds of neural net-
works). A neural network function f(x) ∈ RC can be
linearly upper and lower bounded for all x = xk + ∆x,
where ∆x ∈ Bp(0, ):
L(j,:)∆x+cj ≤ [f(x)]j ≤ U(j,:)∆x+dj ,∀j ∈ [C] (1)
where L,U ∈ RC×dand c,d ∈ RC depend on xk, p, .
Proposition 3.1 is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.2
in CROWN (Zhang et al., 2018), which gives the ex-
plicit form of L,U, c,d as a function of neural network
parameters. A similar outcome can be obtained from
the neural network verification literature (Wong and
Kolter, 2018; Singh et al., 2018; Weng et al., 2018; Wang
et al., 2018b), but CROWN typically gives the tightest
bound. We assume that L,U, c,d are pre-computed
for each example for a given  using CROWN or other
similar algorithms.
To verify if we can change the output of the network
from the ground-truth class i to another class j, we
desire to obtain a lower bound on the margin [f(x)]i−
[f(x)]j . For a training example (xk, yk), we define
the margin between the true class i = yk and other
C−1 classes as a vector function f̂(xk) ∈ RC−1, where
[f̂(xk)]j = [f(xk)]i− [f(xk)]j , for j < i and [f̂(xk)]j =
[f(xk)]i − [f(xk)]j+1 for j ≥ i, j ∈ [C − 1]. To obtain
a lower bound of margin, we define the new network
f̂(x) with the same weights and biases as f(x), except
that the last layer H of f̂(x) is reformed as:
Ŵ
(H)
(j,:) = W
(H)
(i,:) −W(H)(s(j,i),:) (2)
b̂
(H)
j = b
(H)
i − b(H)s(j,i) (3)
where j ∈ [C − 1], s(j, i) =
{
j j < i
j + 1 j ≥ i
s(·, i) is a [C − 1]→ [C] mapping for j that skips the
class i (ground truth class). Then we can lower bound
the margins f̂(x) by Proposition 3.1:
L̂(j,:)∆x+ ĉj ≤ [f̂(x)]j ,∀j ∈ [C − 1],
where L̂ ∈ R(C−1)×d and ĉ ∈ RC−1 implicitly depend
on (xk, yk),  and p. For every x = xk + ∆x, ∆x ∈
Bp(0, ), the following bound holds1:
[f̂(x)]j ≥ L̂(j,:)∆x+ ĉj ≥ −‖L̂(j,:)‖q + ĉj , (4)
where ‖·‖q is the dual norm of ‖·‖p. When [f̂(x)]j > 0
for all x ∈ Bp(xk, ), we cannot change the classifi-
cation of x from class i to any other class, thus no
adversarial examples exist. The q-norm of L̂(j,:) plays
an important rule in the model’s robustness. We de-
fine the margin for target class s(j, yk) based on the
guaranteed lower bound (4):
M(xk, j) := −‖L̂(j,:)‖q + ĉj (5)
With this lower bounds on margin, we can extend the
definition of ordinary classification error and define
verified error, which is a provable upper bound on error
under any norm bounded attacks:
Definition 3.2 (Robustness Certificate and Verified
Error). Given a perturbation radius  where an input
xk can be perturbed arbitrarily within Bp(xk, ), verified
error is the percentage of examples that do not have a
provable robustness certificate:
Verified Error := 1−|{k|M(xk, j) > 0 for all j ∈ [C − 1]}|
N
(6)
1As in Zhang et al. (2018) and many other works, we
illustrate unbounded perturbation (not limited to [0, 1])
to give the lower bound. Using bounded perturbation on
MNIST typically improves verified error by 1-2%.
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In our paper we also use a weaker definition of ver-
ified error (which can be bounded using a surrogate
loss, which will be presented in Section 3.3), where we
consider each attack target individually:
Targeted Verified Error := 1− |{(k, j)|M(xk, j) > 0}|
N × (C − 1) .
(7)
3.2 Linear outer bounds for an ensemble
We denote Mt(xk, j) as the margin for a base model
ft(x). We first note that the lower bound on margin
Mt(xk, j) is unnormalized and not scale-invariant. En-
larging the output of ft(x) by a constant factor does
not affect the robustness of ft(x), but the margin will
also be scaled correspondingly. Directly maximizing
this unnormalized margin does not lead to better ro-
bustness. Intuitively, the most important factor of the
robustness of model ft(x) is the available budget (re-
flected as the term ĉt,j) divided by the sensitivity with
respect to the input (reflected as ‖L̂t,(j,:)‖q), rather
than the absolute value of the margin. When we use
this lower bound on margins as a surrogate to compare
the robustness across different models, their margins
should be within a similar range to make this compar-
ison meaningful. To take this into account, we can
normalize Mt(xk, j) by dividing it with a normalizing
factor Zt := 1N(C−1)
∑N
k=i
∑
j∈[C−1] ĉ
k
t,j , the average ĉ
over all examples and classes. The normalized lower
bound on margin is defined as:
M˜t(xk, j) :=− ‖L˜t,(j,:)‖q + c˜t,j , (8)
where L˜t,(j,:) :=
1
Zt
L̂t,(j,:), c˜t,j :=
1
Zt
ĉt,j .
This is equivalent to applying a constant factor 1Zt . The
normalized model, denoted as f˜t(x) := 1Zt ft(x), will be
used for our ensemble. We can use other normalizing
schemes as long as they roughly keep each model’s
margin in a similar magnitude to ease the optimization.
We define the model ensemble of a set of T neural
networks as F (x) =
∑T
t=1 αtf˜t(x), where 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1,∑T
t=1 αt = 1. αt is the coefficient for classifier f˜t(x).
In our setting, each neural network classifier has been
trained with certificates (Def. 3.2), and we want to
further enhance them using carefully selected ensem-
ble weights. Because they are linearly combined, we
can give a linear upper and lower bound for F (x), by
linearly combining the upper and lower bounds given
by Eq. (1). Again, for a training example (xk, yk), the
lower bound on the margin [F̂ (x)]j of F (x) for the
class j 6= yk inside Bp(xk, ) is:(∑T
t=1
αtL˜t,(j,:)
)
∆x+
∑T
t=1
αtc˜t,j ≤ [F̂ (x)]j (9)
Analogous to Eq. (4), these bounds are guaranteed for
any x = xk + ∆x, ∆x ∈ Bp(0, ). L˜t ∈ R(C−1)×d, c˜t ∈
RC−1 are computed for model f˜t(x) using Proposi-
tion 3.1 with a similar network transformation as in
Eq. (2) and (3) for each f˜t(x). Note that each ft(x) can
have completely different internal structure (number
of layers, number of neurons, architecture, etc) and be
trained using different schemes, but their corresponding
L˜t and c˜t have the same dimension. For the ensemble,
the normalized lower bounds of margin is the following:
M(xk, j) := −‖
∑T
t=1
αtL˜t,(j,:)‖q +
∑T
t=1
αtc˜t,j
(10)
Main Idea: Why an ensemble can improve ro-
bustness? To enhance robustness via an ensemble,
we want to find an optimal α, such that M(xk, j) is
maximized for all training examples k ∈ [N ] and target
classes s(j, yk), j ∈ [C − 1]. A model f˜t(x) lacking
of robustness often has large ‖L˜t,(j,:)‖q; by combining
L˜t,(j,:) of different models with optimal weights, we
hope that some noises in L˜t,(j,:) can be canceled out
and
∑T
t=1 αtL˜t,(j,:) has a smaller q-norm than L˜t,(j,:).
When there are very limited number of models for se-
lection, a naive ensemble (with all αt = 1T ) cannot
guarantee to achieve this goal. Instead, RobBoost
optimally select αt based on maximizing a surrogate
loss on normalized lower bounds of margins.
In Figure 1, we plot matrix L˜ for a naturally trained
and a robust model (adversarially trained using (Madry
et al., 2018)) to show the intuition behind RobBoost.
Strikingly, L˜ has a quite interpretable pattern, espe-
cially on the adversarially trained model – L˜ is sur-
prisingly sparse and the model output is only sensitive
to changes on the pixels of the digit “1”; on the other
hand, the naturally trained model has a lot of random
noise around the “1” in the center, and is sensitive to
many irrelevant background pixel changes. Our aim
is thus to make the matrix L˜ less “noisy” through an
careful ensemble: L˜ =
∑T
t=1 αtL˜t.
3
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1
0
1
2
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Figure 1: Left: visualization of matrix L˜ for a naturally
trained MNIST model. Right: visualization of matrix
L˜ for an adversarially trained MNIST model. Both
models are 4-layer MLPs with 1024 neurons per layer.
We use an image of digit “1” (i = 1) as the input, and
set attack target to “2” (s(j, i) = 2),  = 0.05.
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3.3 The RobBoost Loss Function
We first define the following RobBoost loss to maximize
model’s lower bound of margin via ensemble, across all
examples and classes:
minimize g(α) =
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1]
max(1−M(xk, j), 0)
s.t. 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
∑T
t=1
αi = 1
(11)
where α ∈ RT is the vector of weights for each model
f˜t(x), and M(xk, j) is defined as in Eq. (10). This is a
hinge-style surrogate loss of the 0-1 error defined in (7)
that encourages large margin. We aim to decrease (7)
by using an optimally weighted ensemble.
In this paper, we focus on the most common threat
model where `∞ adversarial distortion (p =∞, q = 1)
is applied (`∞-RobBoost). In this case, Eq. (10) is a
summation of absolute values:
M(xk, j) := −
d∑
i=1
|
T∑
t=1
αtL˜
k
t,(j,i)|+
T∑
t=1
αtc˜
k
t,j (12)
Here we explicitly write out the dependency of k in L˜
and c˜. When j, k is fixed, we can define N×(C−1) new
matrices A ∈ Rd×T with reordered indices and absorb
 into it: Aj,k(i,t) := L˜
k
t,(j,i). And similarly c¯
j,k
t := c˜
k
(t,j)
such that Eq. (12) can be rewritten as:
M(xk, j) = −‖Aj,kα‖1 + c¯j,k>α
Note that for each example k and each target class j
we have an A and a c¯. Then Eq. (11) becomes:
minimize g(α) =∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1]
max(‖Aj,kα‖1 − c¯j,k>α+ 1, 0)
s.t. 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
∑T
t=1
αi = 1
(13)
Since the objective is non-smooth, piece-wise linear and
low-dimensional, we propose to use coordinate descent
to efficiently solve this minimization problem.
Solving `∞-RobBoost using coordinate-descent.
In coordinate descent, we aim to solve the following
one variable optimization problem with a randomly
selected coordinate t:
α∗t = arg min
0≤αt≤1
g(αt), where
g(αt) =
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1]
max(‖Aj,kα‖1 − c¯j,k>α+ 1, 0)
=
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1]
max(‖αtAj,k(:,t) +Aj,k(α− αtet)‖1−
c¯j,k>(α− αtet)− c¯j,kαt + 1, 0)
:=
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1]
max(‖αtAj,k(:,t) + vj,k‖1+
uj,k − c¯j,k>αt + 1, 0)
s.t.
∑T
t=1
αi = 1
(14)
where vj,k = Aj,k(α−αtet) and uj,k = c¯j,k>(α−αtet)
are constants with respect to αt. While the box con-
straint 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1 can be easily handled by coordinate-
descent, the challenge is the constraint
∑T
t=1 αi = 1,
which needs to be directly enforced during the coordi-
nate descent procedure. Suppose we have maintained∑T
t=1 αi = 1 before update, when updating variable αt,
we enforce this constraint by scaling all other αs, s 6= t
by a factor of 1−αt∑
s 6=t αs
such that αt +
∑
s6=t αs ≡ 1. In
other words, we redefine g(αt) as:
g(αt) =
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1]
max(‖αtAj,k(:,t) +
1− αt∑
s6=t αs
vj,k‖1
+
1− αt∑
s 6=t αs
uj,k − c¯j,k>αt + 1, 0)
:=
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1]
max(‖αtωj,k + νj,k‖1 + γj,kαt + µj,k + 1, 0)
:=
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1]
max(gj,k(αt), 0)
(15)
where ωj,k := Aj,k(:,t) − 1∑s 6=t αs vj,k, νj,k = 1∑s 6=t αs vj,k
and µj,k = u
j,k∑
s 6=t αs
+ 1, γj,k = −c¯j,k> − 1∑
s 6=t αs
. Now
the summation constraint has been removed, and for
any 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1 we guarantee
∑T
t=1 αi = 1. Each
term gj,k(αt) is a bounded one-dimensional piece-wise
linear function within domain 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1. The term
‖αtωj,k+νj,k‖1 contains d linear terms inside absolute
value so there are at most d pieces. The minima of
this term must be on the end of one piece, or at the
boundary 0 or 1. Solving for αt in d equations αtω
j,k
l +
νj,kl = 0, l ∈ [d] gives us the locations of the end points
of these pieces in O(d) time, denoted as rj,k1 , · · · , rj,kd .
We consider the worst case where all d points lie in
(0, 1), and for convenience we denote rj,k0 = 0, r
j,k
d+1 =
1. Now the challenge remains to efficiently evaluate
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gj,k(αt) at these d endpoint and two boundaries, each
in O(1) time. We first sort rj,k1 , · · · , rj,kd in ascending
order as rj,kpi(1), · · · , rj,kpi(d), where pi is the permutation of
sorting and we additionally define pi(0) := 0. Then, we
start with rj,k0 = 0, and check the sign of z
j,k
l (αt) :=
αtω
j,k
l + ν
j,k
l at αt = r
j,k
0 for each l ∈ [d]. We define
two sets indicating the sign of zj,kl :
Jj,k+ = {l|zj,kl (0) > 0, or zj,kl (0) = 0,ωj,kl > 0} (16)
Jj,k− = {l|zj,kl (0) < 0, or zj,kl (0) = 0,ωj,kl < 0} (17)
They can be formed in O(d) time. Then we define the
effective slope and intercept at the point r0 as:
aj,k0 =
∑
l∈Jj,k+
ωj,kl −
∑
l∈Jj,k−
ωj,kl + γ
j,k (18)
bj,k0 =
∑
l∈Jj,k+
νj,kl −
∑
l∈Jj,k−
νj,kl + µ
j,k (19)
and then we can evaluate gj,k(rj,k0 ) = a
j,k
0 × rj,k0 + bj,k0 .
For i = {1, · · · , N ′}, we evaluate gj,k(rj,kpi(i)) one by one.
Assuming we already obtained aj,km and bj,km (m < d)
and evaluated gj,k(rj,kpi(m)) = a
j,k
m r
j,k
pi(m) + b
j,k
m . We can
then recursively define aj,km+1 and b
j,k
m+1 as:
aj,km+1 = a
j,k
m + I(pi(m+ 1) ∈ Jj,k− ) · 2ωj,kpi(m+1)
− I(pi(m+ 1) ∈ Jj,k+ ) · 2ωj,kpi(m+1)
(20)
bj,km+1 = b
j,k
m + I(pi(m+ 1) ∈ Jj,k− ) · 2νj,kpi(m+1)
− I(pi(m+ 1) ∈ Jj,k+ ) · 2νj,kpi(m+1)
(21)
I(·) is an indicator function. We keep maintaining
the slope and intercept for the next linear piece, when
the sign of term pi(m+ 1) just changed. This update
only takes O(1) time. For m = d+ 1, we reached the
boundary 1 and evaluate gj,k(1) = aj,kd × 1 + bj,kd .
For the final sum of surrogate losses, we merge sort all
rj,ki for all (j, k) terms into a new vector r withN×(C−
1)× d elements, also maintain a mapping p(i)→ (j, k)
which maps an element ri into the summation term
(j, k) it comes from. Our final algorithm evaluates the
objective function on all ri and using the maintained
effective slope aj,k and intercept bj,k for each term
in summation, and update ap(i) and bp(i) using (20)
and (21). Additionally, we need to consider up to NC
additional linear pieces introduced by the max function.
We list the full algorithm in appendix in Algorithm 1.
In each iteration of coordinate descent, we randomly
choose a coordinate t, and obtain the best value α∗t (14)
to minimize the loss and set αt ← α∗t . Then we choose
another coordinate and repeat. We observe that 2 to
3 epochs (each epoch visits all coordinate once) are
sufficient to find a good solution.
3.4 RobBoost in Gradient Boosting
Gradient Boosting builds a strong model F (x) by iter-
atively training and combining weak models:
Fm+1(x) = Fm(x) + fm+1(x)
where Fm(x) =
∑m
t=1 ft(x) is kept unchanged and
we train fm+1(x) to reduce a certain loss function on
Fm+1(x). Unlike the setting we discussed in Section 3.3
where all base models are given and fixed, here we are
allowed to update the model parameters of the last
base model, with previous models frozen. Similar to
Eq. (10), we can write the margin for example xk target
class j for the setting of gradient boosting:
M(xk, j) :=− ‖
∑m
t=1
L̂t + L̂m+1‖q
+
∑m
t=1
ĉt + ĉm+1
(22)
Suppose we have some surrogate loss function `, we
define the following loss function:
L :=
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1]
`(M(xk, j))
=
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1]
`(−‖
∑m
t=1
L̂t + L̂m+1‖q
+
∑m
t=1
ĉt + ĉm+1)
(23)
Note that all L̂t, ĉt for t = {1, · · · ,m} are pre-
computed and can be treated as constants, and
L̂m+1, ĉm+1 are functions of the neural network param-
eters Wm+1,bm+1 of model fm+1 (due to Prop. 3.1,
see Wong and Kolter (2018); Zhang et al. (2018) for
the explicit form). We can thus take the gradient
∂L
∂Wm+1
, ∂L∂bm+1 and use typical gradient-based opti-
mization tools to update model fm+1(x) and reduce the
loss L. Compared to the setting in the previous section
where each base model is trained independently and
then fixed, in (23), model fm+1(x) knows the “weakness”
of the ensemble of all previous models, and attempts
to “fix” it, offering more flexibility.
4 Experiments
Overview and Setup. We evaluate the effective-
ness of RobBoost, by using it to find the best ensemble
in a relatively large pool of models on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets. Since we focus on improving cer-
tified robustness, our main metric to evaluate model
robustness is verified error on test set, as defined in (6);
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Table 1: Examples eliminated in preprocessing
Dataset  Eliminated because Eliminated because NOTrobust to all models robust to all models
MNIST
0.1 97.67% 0.07%
0.2 91.85% 0.42%
0.3 69.69% 2.84%
CIFAR 2/255 65.60% 3.97%8/255 56.23% 14.11%
this is a provable upper bound of PGD attack error and
has been used as the standard way to evaluate certified
defense methods (Wong and Kolter, 2018; Wong et al.,
2018). Since there is no existing work on boosting
provable robustness, our baseline is the naive ensemble,
where each model is equally weighted. Because our pur-
pose is to show how optimally RobBoost weights each
base model, we do not focus on tuning each base model
to achieve state-of-the-art results on each dataset. We
use small base models, where all MNIST models sum
to 9.1 MB and all CIFAR models sum to 10.0 MB. We
precompute L̂ for all training examples for each model.
This precomputation takes similar time as 1 epoch of
robust training (Wong and Kolter, 2018), since they
need to compute the same bounds every epoch for train-
ing a single robust model, and they typically need 100
to 200 epochs for training. The time of our experiments
is dominated by training each base models (hours to
days each) rather than precomputing these matrices
and solving the ensemble objective (1-2 hours).
Data Elimination. We first remove all data points
that have positive margins on all base models, as they
will remain robust regardless of any positive weights.
Similarly, we remove all data points that have negative
margins on all base models, as the ensemble is not
capable to improve robustness for them. These pre-
processing steps allow us to focus on the data points
whose robustness can be potentially enhanced, and
also reduce the effective training data size. In Table 1,
we report the percentage of examples eliminated in
this preprocessing step. For all models, a large por-
tion of examples (ranging from 70% to 97%) can be
excluded from the optimization step, greatly improving
the efficiency of RobBoost.
Ensemble of robustly trained models with dif-
ferent architectures. We train 12 MNIST models
and 11 CIFAR models with a variety of architectures.
The models are trained using convex adversarial poly-
tope (Wong et al., 2018), a certified defense method, un-
der different `∞ norm perturbations ( = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}
for MNIST and  = { 2255 , 8255} for CIFAR). Even the
largest CIFAR model used is much smaller than the
best ResNet model in Wong et al. (2018) (40 MB),
as we desire to use an ensemble of small models to
obtain better robustness than a single large model. For
CIFAR, the smallest model is around 0.1 MB and the
largest is 3 MB; see more details on model structure
in Appendix B. We list results in Table 2. We can
observe that RobBoost consistently outperforms naive
averaging ensemble in both verified and clean error.
Also the ensemble model we created performs better
in all metrics than the single large model reported in
literature (Wong et al., 2018).
In Figure 3, we plot the distributions of lower bounds
of margins M(xk, j) for two models. A value less than
0 indicates that an example cannot be certified. Com-
pared to the naive ensemble, we can clearly observe
that the distributions of margins for RobBoost ensem-
bles have more mass on the positive side, reflecting the
improvements on certified robustness.
Ensemble of the same model architecture with
feature subsampled data. A common practice in
building traditional ensemble models like random forest
is to use feature subsampling, i.e., each base model only
uses a subset of the features to train. In this experiment,
we use only 1 model structure but randomly sample 80%
pixels to train the model (a recent work (Hosseini et al.,
2019) presented a similar idea, but their method is not
a certified defense). We train 5 feature sub-sampled
models for MNIST with  = 0.3 and CIFAR with
 = 2255 . In Table 3, we list the verified error and clean
error of each model for both the naive ensemble and
RobBoost ensemble. Since there are only 5 base models,
RobBoost ensembles provide a small but consistent
performance advantage in verified error.
Gradient Boosting of Robust Ensemble. Unlike
previous experiments where all base models are given
and fixed, we follow Eq. (23) and train models incremen-
tally. We use cross-entropy loss and train an ensemble
of 5 models on MNIST with  = 0.3 and CIFAR with
 = 2255 in Figure 2. We observe that usually the first
2 or 3 models decrease verified errors most (on MNIST
from 39.8% to 34.6%, and on CIFAR from 51.18% to
49.55%. It is challenging to further decrease this error
with more models, but gradient boosting allows us to
fix the data points lacking of robustness on previous
models, achieving better performance than Table 2.
5 Conclusion
We propose the the first ensemble algorithm, RobBoost,
to enhance provable model robustness by optimally
weighting each base model. Our algorithm involves
optimizing a surrogate of the lower bound of classifica-
tion margin through the proposed coordinate descent
algorithm, and consistently outperforms a naive averag-
ing ensemble as well as a state-of-the-art single model
certified defense in verified error and clean accuracy.
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Table 2: Comparison of verified error, clean error and PGD error of RobBoost and naive ensembles. As a
comparison to single model defense, for MNIST  = 0.3, the best model in Wong et al. (2018) achieves 43.10%
verified error and 14.87% clean error; for CIFAR  = 8255 , the ResNet (best) model in Wong et al. (2018) achieves
78.22% verified error and 71.33% clean error. All our CIFAR models combined have a smaller size (10 MB) than
the ResNet model in Wong et al. (2018) (40 MB), and the RobBoost ensemble outperforms the single largest
model in Wong et al. (2018) in both clean and verified error.
Model  Ensemble Verified Error Clean Error PGD Error EnsembleTrain Test Test Test Model Size
MNIST
0.1 Naive 3.55% 4.56% 0.39% 1.56% 9.1MRobBoost 2.65% 4.47% 0.39% 1.17% 5.3M
0.2 Naive 13.82% 13.66% 2.34% 3.91% 9.1MRobBoost 12.41% 12.58% 1.95% 3.12% 7.4M
0.3 Naive 39.22% 38.60% 11.33% 19.92% 9.1MRobBoost 37.42% 36.61% 9.77% 19.53% 5.7M
CIFAR
2/255 Naive 50.02% 51.68% 38.28% 45.31% 10.0MRobBoost 47.27% 49.51% 34.77% 41.80% 6.1M
8/255 Naive 74.95% 74.50% 62.89% 71.09% 10.0MRobBoost 74.56% 74.27% 60.94% 69.14% 5.6M
Table 3: Naive and RobBoost ensembles on 5 small models with the same architecture but trained on different
feature subsamples. Since they have the same architecture, their robustness are similar and the optimal weight for
each model is close to 15 ; in this case the naive baseline is close to RobBoost as it is a special case of RobBoost.
Dataset  Test Error Base Models No. Naive RobBoost1 2 3 4 5
MNIST 0.3 Clean 12.96% 13.99% 23.88% 12.77% 18.50% 13.34% 12.51%Verified 42.98% 45.3% 51.62% 45.13% 49.32% 43.94% 42.84%
CIFAR 2/255 Clean 42.33% 42.15% 41.77% 42.43% 41.86% 40.79% 40.77%Verified 55.00% 55.11% 54.97% 54.73% 55.07% 53.61% 53.61%
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Figure 2: RobBoost in gradient boosting setting. With
3-5 base models RobBoost significantly reduces both
verified and clean errors on both CIFAR and MNIST
datasets compared to a single base model.
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Figure 3: Distribution of margins’ lower bounds. Rob-
Boost moves the margins towards the positive side; a
margin greater than 0 indicates that an example is
certifiably robust.
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A The Coordinate Descent Algorithm for RobBoost
Algorithm 1 One-step Coordinate Decent Update
Input: N × (C − 1) vectors ωj,k ∈ Rd, νj,k ∈ Rd and N × (C − 1) scalars γj,k and µj,k which are formed based
(15), j ∈ [C − 1], k ∈ [N ], current weight vector α and the coordinate t to be updated
Output: an updated weight αt for coordinate t
1: for (j, k) ∈ [C − 1]× [N ] do
2: Solve rj,k1 , · · · , rj,kd , where αtωj,kl + νj,kl = 0, l ∈ [d]
3: Sort rj,k1 , · · · , rj,kd in ascending order pij,k
4: Compute Jj,k+ , J
j,k
− according to (16) and (17)
5: Compute aj,k0 , b
j,k
0 according to (18) and (19)
6: Initial N × (C − 1) index counters mj,k ← 0
7: Merge sort all N × (C − 1) lists rj,k into one list r with N × (C − 1)× d elements in ascending order pi
8: Maintain two mappings p(i)→ (j, k), q(i)→ l where ri comes from the element rj,kl during merge
9: Initial list hj,k where hj,k ← −bj,k0
aj,k0
if −b
j,k
0
aj,k0
> 0; ∞ otherwise {stores all the positive 0-crossing points}
10: Lb ←
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1] max(b
j,k
0 , 0), αbest ← 0 {Initial best loss, best αt at point αt = 0}
11: i← 1
12: while i ≤ N × (C − 1)× d do
13: if rpi(i) ≤ 0 or rpi(i) ≥ 1 then
14: (j, k)← p(i), M ← mj,k + 1, mj,k ← mj,k + 1
15: aj,kM ← aj,kM−1 {Skip all rpi(i) out of the [0, 1] range}
16: bj,kM ← bj,kM−1
17: continue
(j′, k′)← arg minj,k hj,k
18: if rpi(i) > hj
′,k′ and hj
′,k′ > 0 then
19: x← hj′,k′ {Evaluate at a 0-crossing point for term (j′, k′)}
20: hj
′,k′ ←∞ {Note that we do not increment counter i in this case}
21: else
22: (j, k)← p(i), M ← mj,k + 1, mj,k ← mj,k + 1
23: Update aj,kM , b
j,k
M recursively using a
j,k
M−1, b
j,k
M−1 based on (20) and (21)
24: if −b
j,k
M
aj,kM
> rpi(i) then
25: hj,k ← −b
j,k
M
aj,kM
{Update the 0-crossing point we might encounter}
26: else
27: hj,k ←∞ {This piece does not cross 0 when we scan forward}
28: x← rpi(i)
29: i← i+ 1
30: Compute gj,k(x) = aj,k
mj,k
x+ bj,k
mj,k
, for all (j, k) ∈ [C − 1]× [N ]
31: Compute Loss at current point L =
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1] max(g
j,k(x), 0)
32: if L < Lb then
33: Lb ← L, αbest ← x {Update best loss}
34: return αbest
Here we present our full algorithm to optimally update one coordinate in coordinate descent. First, we rewrite
our objective function:
g(αt) =
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1]
max(‖αtωj,k + νj,k‖1 + γj,kαt + µj,k + 1, 0) (24)
:=
∑
k∈[N ]
∑
j∈[C−1]
max(gj,k(αt), 0) (25)
There are N × (C − 1) terms in summation (25), and we need to maintain “effective slope” aj,k and “effective
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intercept” bj,k for each term (j, k) using the technique presented in the main text. Thus most variables have
superscript (j, k). Note that to deal with the max function in hinge loss, for each term we need to dynamically
maintain the possible zero crossing point, which is stored in hj,k (line 9). If we reached a zero-crossing point before
any other rpi(i), we need to evaluate the function value at this zero-crossing point first (line 19). Additionally, once
the effective slope aj,kM and effective intercept b
j,k
M change due to a sign change in absolute value terms, we need to
update the zero-crossing point hj,k (line 25). In each iteration of coordinate descent, we choose a coordinate t,
obtain (14) using Algorithm 1 and set αt ← α∗t . Initially, we can set αt = 1T , then we can run several epochs
of coordinate descent; in each epoch we optimize over all αt once, either in a cyclic order or a random order.
Although coordinate descent cannot always find the global optimal solution, we found that it usually reduces the
loss function sufficiently and rapidly; 2 or 3 epochs are sufficient for all our experiments.
B Model Details
We implement all our models using PyTorch. Using model structures detailed in Table 4, we obtain 12 MNIST
models and 11 CIFAR-10 models (without the last largest ResNet due to out of memory), robustly trained using
the method proposed in Wong et al. (2018). For MNIST and CIFAR-10 we use the same model structure; only
the input image shape differs.
For experiments on ensemble of robustly trained models, we use all available models. For experiments on feature
subsample, we use model K for both MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. For experiments on the ensemble of graident
boosted models, we use model A,C,E,G,K for MNIST and B,G,I,J,K for CIFAR-10 dataset.
Table 4: Models structures. All layers are followed by ReLU activations. The last fully connected layer with a
fixed 10-dimensional output is omitted. “Conv kw × h+ s” corresponds to a 2D convolutional layer with k filters
of size w × h using a stride of s in both dimensions. [·] stands for a Resnet block.
Name Model details
A Conv 4 4× 4+2, Conv 8 4× 4+2, FC 128
B Conv 8 4× 4+2, Conv 16 4× 4+2, FC 256
C Conv 4 3× 3+1, Conv 8 3× 3+1, Conv 8 4× 4+4, FC 64
D Conv 8 3× 3+1, Conv 16 3× 3+1, Conv 16 4× 4+4, FC 128
E Conv 4 5× 5+1, Conv 8 5× 5+1, Conv 8 5× 5+4, FC 64
F Conv 8 5× 5+1, Conv 16 5× 5+1, Conv 16 5× 5+4, FC 128
G Conv 4 3× 3+1, Conv 4 4× 4+2, Conv 8 3× 3+1, Conv 8 4× 4+2, FC 256, FC 256
H Conv 4 3× 3+1, Conv 4 4× 4+2, Conv 8 3× 3+1, Conv 8 4× 4+2, FC 512, FC 512
I Conv 8 3× 3+1, Conv 8 4× 4+2, Conv 16 3× 3+1, Conv 16 4× 4+2, FC 256, FC 256
J Conv 8 3× 3+1, Conv 8 4× 4+2, Conv 16 3× 3+1, Conv 16 4× 4+2, FC 512, FC 512
K Conv 4 3× 3+1, [Conv 8 4× 4+2, Conv 8 3× 3+1 Conv 8 3× 3+1], [Conv 8 4× 4+2, Conv 8 3× 3+1 Conv 8 3× 3+1], FC 128
L Conv 8 3× 3+1, [Conv 16 4× 4+2, Conv16 3× 3+1 Conv 16 3× 3+1], [Conv 16 4× 4+2, Conv 16 3× 3+1 Conv 16 3× 3+1], FC 256
